64 ideas
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| 9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
| 9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
| 17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
| 18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
| 13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| 13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| 13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
| 13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| 13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
| 13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
| 13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| 13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| 20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
| 20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
| 20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
| 20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
| 20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
| 20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
| 20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
| 20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
| 20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
| 20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
| 20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
| 20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
| 20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
| 20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
| 20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
| 20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
| 20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
| 20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
| 20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
| 20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
| 20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
| 20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
| 20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
| 20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |