16 ideas
| 23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
| 23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
| 23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
| 9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
| 9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
| 23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
| 23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
| 17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
| 23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
| 18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
| 13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
| 13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
| 14528 | Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |