Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Parsons, Catherine Z. Elgin and H.A. Prichard

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
9254 In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8616 How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
8617 Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9470 Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13418 The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9469 Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
9468 On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
18201 General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
13419 If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13417 If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8618 Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
9261 The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
9262 The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
9256 I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
9257 The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
9260 Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
9259 We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
9255 Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9258 If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]