Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Parsons, Earl Conee and Hamid Vahid

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9470 Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13418 The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9469 Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
9468 On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
18201 General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
13419 If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13417 If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19520 Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19521 If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
19522 More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
19523 Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19555 People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19557 Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
19556 Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
12890 That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
12892 Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]