14 ideas
9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
23559 | We have the concept of 'knowledge' as a label for good informants [Craig, by Fricker,M] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |