Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Parsons, Harry Gildersleve and Catherine Z. Elgin

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12 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]