43 ideas
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
15200 | How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
14761 | Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart] |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
22628 | Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart] |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
2608 | For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer] |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
22936 | A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
4231 | Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
8591 | There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart] |
22935 | The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
7802 | A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle] |
4230 | A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
15199 | The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |