Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Parsons, Richard L. Kirkham and Mulligan/Simons/Smith

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]