Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Parsons, W Wimsatt/W Beardsley and John Duns Scotus

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38 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9470 Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13418 The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9469 Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
9468 On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
18201 General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
13419 If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22121 The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22122 Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
16660 Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13417 If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
22125 Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
22127 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
16650 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16776 Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
16626 Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16614 Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
22129 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
22130 Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
22128 Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22131 The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
20400 Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
7266 The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7267 Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7268 The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7269 The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7271 Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22123 The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
22124 We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]