226 ideas
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
8988 | Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton] |
8987 | On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton] |
8992 | Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton] |
12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton] |
18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton] |
12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton] |
12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
8989 | The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton] |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
8990 | So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton] |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |