Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Sanders Peirce, Michael J. Sandel and Stoic school

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241 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men participate in politics, especially if it shows moral progress [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
Wise men are never astonished at things which other people take to be wonders [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wise man has yet been discovered [Stoic school, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Stoic physics concerns cosmos, elements and causes (with six detailed divisions) [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Ethics studies impulse, good, passion, virtue, goals, value, action, appropriateness, encouragement [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
True philosophising is not memorising ideas, but living by them [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Some facts are indispensable for an effect, and others actually necessitate the effect [Stoic school, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The Stoics distinguished spoken logos from logos within the mind [Stoic school, by Plotinus]
Stoics study canons, criteria and definitions, in order to find the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Stoics believed that rational capacity in man (logos) is embodied in the universe [Stoic school, by Long]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectics is mastery of question and answer form [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
Falsehoods corrupt a mind, producing passions and instability [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Stoics like syllogisms, for showing what is demonstrative, which corrects opinions [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Stoics avoided universals by paraphrasing 'Man is...' as 'If something is a man, then it is...' [Stoic school, by Long]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
Stoics applied bivalence to sorites situations, so everyone is either vicious or wholly virtuous [Stoic school, by Williamson]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics have four primary categories: substrates, qualities, dispositions, relative dispositions [Stoic school, by Simplicius]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic Forms are just our thoughts [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Stoics say matter has qualities, and substance underlies it, with no form or qualities [Stoic school, by Chalcidius]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school]
How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school]
Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
A proposition is possible if it is true when nothing stops it being true [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are false if the falsehood of the conclusion does not conflict with the antecedent [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is a secure grasp of presentations which cannot be reversed by argument [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Two sorts of opinion: either poorly grounded belief, or weak belief [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
There are non-sensible presentations, which come to us through the intellect [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
Stoics say we are born like a blank sheet of paper; the first concepts on it are sensations [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
At birth the soul is a blank sheet ready to be written on [Stoic school, by Aetius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Stoic perception is a presentation to which one voluntarily assents [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
For Stoics knowledge is an assertion which never deviates from the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Eight parts of the soul: five senses, seeds, speech and reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Division of the soul divides a person, reducing responsibility for the nonrational part [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
Stoics say the soul is a mixture of air and fire [Stoic school, by Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our conceptions arise from experience, similarity, analogy, transposition, composition and opposition [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
For Stoics the true self is defined by what I can be master of [Stoic school, by Foucault]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Stoics expanded the idea of compulsion, and contracted what counts as one's own actions [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The free will problem was invented by the Stoics [Stoic school, by Berlin]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The nearest to ancient determinism is Stoic fate, but that is controlled by a sympathetic God [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Stoics classify passions according to the opinion of good and bad which they imply [Stoic school, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are four basic emotions: pleasure or delight, distress, appetite, and fear [Stoic school, by Cicero]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth [Stoic school, by Fogelin]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are incomplete 'lekta' [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric has three types, four modes, and four sections [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Earlier Stoics speak of assent, but not of choice, let alone of a will [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Stoics said responsibility depends on rationality [Stoic school, by Sorabji]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics use 'kalon' (beautiful) as a synonym for 'agathon' (good) [Bury on Stoic school]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Stoics say that folly alone is evil [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Prime values apply to the life in agreement; useful values apply to the natural life [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
The appraiser's value is what is set by someone experienced in the facts [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The goal is to live consistently with the constitution of a human being [Stoic school, by Clement]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Stoics said health is an 'indifferent', but they still considered it preferable [Stoic school, by Pormann]
The health of the soul is a good blend of beliefs [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Stoic morality says that one's own happiness will lead to impartiality [Stoic school, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous men do not feel sexual desire, which merely focuses on physical beauty [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Stoicism was an elitist option to lead a beautiful life [Stoic school, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Final goods: confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment and no pain, good spirits, virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness for the Stoics was an equable flow of life [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the end and goal, achieved by living virtuously, in agreement, and according to nature [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Stoics say pleasure is at most a byproduct of finding what is suitable for us [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Rapture is a breakdown of virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel]
Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel]
Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
If humans are citizens of the world (not just a state) then virtue is all good human habits [Stoic school, by Mautner]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
An appropriate action is one that can be defended, perhaps by its consistency. [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour is just, courageous, orderly or knowledgeable. It is praiseworthy, or functions well [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
The Stoics rejected entirely the high value that had been placed on contemplation [Stoic school, by Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Stoics do not despise external goods, but subject them to reason, and not to desire [Taylor,R on Stoic school]
Crafts like music and letters are virtuous conditions, and they accord with virtue [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
For Stoics, obligations are determined by social role [Taylor,R on Stoic school]
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is distinguished by knowing conditional truths, because impressions are connected [Stoic school, by Long]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel]
A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel]
Stoics favour a mixture of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
The best government blends democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
The Stoics saw the whole world as a city [Stoic school, by Long]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten]
Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit]
Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel]
In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel]
Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel]
Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel]
Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel]
Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel]
Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Stoics originated the concept of natural law, as agreed correct reasoning [Stoic school, by Annas]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is reasonable, for one's country or friends, or because of very bad health [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Stoics say a wise man will commit suicide if he has a good enough reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Stoic 'nature' is deterministic, physical and teleological [Stoic school, by Annas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Unlike Epicurus, Stoics distinguish the Whole from the All, with the latter including the void [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The cosmos is regularly consumed and reorganised by the primary fire [Stoic school, by Aristocles]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Early Stoics called the logos 'god', meaning not a being, but the principle of the universe [Stoic school]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Stoics say god is matter, or an inseparable quality of it, or is the power within it [Stoic school, by Chalcidius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Virtuous souls endure till the end, foolish souls for a short time, animal souls not at all [Stoic school, by Eusebius]
Stoics say virtuous souls last till everything ends in fire, but foolish ones fade away [Stoic school, by ]