183 ideas
19608 | Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran] |
23064 | So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran] |
19624 | Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran] |
19599 | Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran] |
19631 | The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran] |
19645 | Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran] |
19629 | A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran] |
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
19618 | I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran] |
19621 | Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran] |
19607 | The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran] |
19638 | Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
19620 | Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran] |
23072 | Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran] |
14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
23075 | A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
19630 | No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
19636 | Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran] |
19642 | Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran] |
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
23066 | Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
19632 | An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
23077 | The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
23068 | People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
23078 | Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran] |
23073 | Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran] |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
19626 | Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
23076 | If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
19633 | We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran] |
14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
23065 | If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran] |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
19615 | I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran] |
23071 | We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran] |
23070 | We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
19628 | At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran] |
19646 | Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
19614 | Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
19634 | Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran] |
19619 | To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran] |
19622 | The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran] |
19617 | Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran] |
19612 | The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran] |
19604 | Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran] |
19606 | We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran] |
19601 | Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran] |
23074 | In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran] |
19640 | No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran] |
19602 | You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran] |
23069 | Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran] |
19644 | History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran] |
19641 | If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran] |
23062 | It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran] |
19613 | It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran] |
19627 | Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran] |
19625 | The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
19605 | Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran] |
19637 | History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran] |
19610 | Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran] |
19611 | No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran] |
19609 | If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran] |
23067 | Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran] |
19639 | We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
19603 | Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran] |
19616 | As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran] |
19600 | When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran] |
19643 | A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran] |
23063 | The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran] |
19623 | Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran] |