30 ideas
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
| 12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
| 12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
| 12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
| 12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 7621 | Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| 22955 | Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield] |
| 20638 | General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close] |
| 12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |
| 20636 | Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close] |
| 21230 | The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
| 21231 | Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
| 20634 | General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close] |
| 20648 | Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein] |
| 21232 | Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
| 7626 | I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein] |