34 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
3015 | The virtue of man is thoughtful foresight of future events [Chilo, by Diog. Laertius] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |