110 ideas
| 6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
| 6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
| 6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
| 14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
| 7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
| 7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
| 6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
| 14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
| 22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
| 6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
| 6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| 8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
| 14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
| 14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
| 14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
| 6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
| 14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
| 14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| 13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| 13858 | The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| 14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| 14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
| 14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
| 14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
| 14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
| 14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
| 14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
| 14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
| 14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
| 6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
| 6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
| 7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
| 7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
| 7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
| 20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
| 6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
| 6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
| 7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
| 7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
| 7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
| 24016 | Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre] |
| 6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
| 22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
| 4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
| 4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
| 4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
| 3847 | Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre] |
| 7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
| 7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
| 7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
| 7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
| 22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
| 7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
| 7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
| 7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
| 7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
| 7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
| 7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
| 3846 | Man IS freedom [Sartre] |
| 6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
| 6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
| 6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
| 7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
| 7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
| 7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
| 24013 | An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre] |
| 24017 | Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre] |
| 24014 | Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre] |
| 24015 | Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre] |
| 6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
| 6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
| 6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
| 6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
| 6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
| 6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
| 6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
| 6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
| 7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
| 6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
| 7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
| 3843 | There is no human nature [Sartre] |
| 20762 | There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre] |
| 3852 | If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre] |
| 22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
| 20764 | In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre] |
| 3015 | The virtue of man is thoughtful foresight of future events [Chilo, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3848 | Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre] |
| 20763 | When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre] |
| 22229 | Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre] |
| 20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
| 3842 | Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre] |
| 6868 | 'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin] |
| 3844 | Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre] |
| 20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
| 22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
| 20754 | It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre] |
| 22230 | Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22232 | Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre] |
| 3851 | If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre] |
| 6571 | When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin] |
| 20491 | States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J] |
| 21240 | The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell] |
| 6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
| 3845 | Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre] |