30 ideas
21900 | Deleuze relies on Spinoza (immanence), Bergson (duration), and difference (Nietzsche) [May] |
22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
21898 | For existentialists the present is empty without the pull of the future and weight of the past [May] |
21905 | Liberal theory starts from the governed, not from the governor [May] |
22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |