Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Chris Daly, C.I. Lewis and Julia Driver

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8526 We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8527 More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly]
8528 If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
7803 Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
23146 Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
23147 Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver]
23144 Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver]
23148 Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver]
23150 Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
23149 If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]