18 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18241 | Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
18242 | Confucius shows that ethics can rest on reason, rather than on revelation [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |