47 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
18241 | Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
18242 | Confucius shows that ethics can rest on reason, rather than on revelation [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |