146 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
6040 | There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |