Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Chuang Tzu, Hastings Rashdall and Michael Williams

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
7278 Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
7281 Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
7282 Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
7284 If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
3593 The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
3585 Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
3584 Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
3599 Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
7289 Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3591 We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
3582 Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
3592 Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
3579 Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3581 Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3564 Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8851 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
3595 What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8849 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
3580 Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
3578 Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
8855 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3576 Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
3577 Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
3589 Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
3590 Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3571 Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
3574 Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3569 In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
3567 How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
3586 Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
3573 Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
3565 Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3566 We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3594 Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
3575 Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
23403 You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
7285 Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3587 Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
1457 Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7277 The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
7286 To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
3588 Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
7279 If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
23404 Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
6674 All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
7283 Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
6673 Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
7280 As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
1458 Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
1459 Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
7288 Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
7287 Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]