24 ideas
19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
19261 | Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |
19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |