Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cleanthes, Simone Weil and Leon Horsten

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164 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil]
Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil]
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten]
Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten]
An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten]
'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten]
A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten]
The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten]
Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten]
By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten]
Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten]
If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil]
We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil]
The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
When we admire a work, we see ourselves as its creator [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Those who say immorality is not an aesthetic criterion must show that all criteria are aesthetic [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil]
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil]
We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil]
We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil]
Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
People in power always try to increase their power [Weil]
In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil]
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil]
After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil]
We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil]
It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
Once money is the main aim, society needs everyone to think wealth is possible [Weil]
The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil]
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil]
People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil]
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil]
Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil]
The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil]
Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil]
Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil]
Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Dividing history books into separate chapters is disastrous [Weil]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil]
The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]
The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The cruelty of the Old Testament put me off Christianity [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
I attach little importance to immortality, which is an undecidable fact, and irrelevant to us [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]