Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cleanthes, Verity Harte and Derek Parfit

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
20771 Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
5515 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
15842 An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
15841 Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15858 Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5516 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15837 What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
15839 If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
15838 The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3539 Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
5514 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
1393 One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
1392 If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
5519 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
5520 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
1391 Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
5518 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
6028 Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
20831 The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9762 We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
5993 The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]