Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Confucius, Francis Hutcheson and Stathis Psillos

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62 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]