Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Craig Bourne, Jacob Zabarella and Fred Sommers

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne]
It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne]
Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne]
Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne]
Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne]
B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne]