Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Craig Bourne, Judith (Jarvis) Thomson and Earl Conee

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33 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne]
It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson]
Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot]
A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson]
Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson]
The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson]
It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson]
No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson]
The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne]
Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne]
Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne]
Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne]
B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne]