80 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
| 3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
| 3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
| 3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| 3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
| 3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
| 4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
| 4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| 3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
| 3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
| 3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
| 4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
| 21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
| 21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
| 21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
| 21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
| 21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
| 21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
| 21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| 4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
| 3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 3568 | Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A] |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| 4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| 4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
| 3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
| 3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
| 3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |