Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Crispin Wright, Adam Gopnik and Jeff McMahan

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80 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Most good social changes are incremental, rather than revolutionary [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Conservatives often want peace, prosperity and tolerance, but not social fairness [Gopnik]
Conservatives believe obedience and rank are essential to social order [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The opposite of liberalism is dogmatism [Gopnik]
People are fallible, so liberalism tries to distribute power [Gopnik]
Liberals have tried very hard to build a conscience into their institutions [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Left-wingers are inconsistent in their essentialist descriptions of social groups [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberal community is not blood ties or tradition, but shared choices, and sympathy for the losers [Gopnik]
Liberal community includes flight from the family, into energetic reforming groups [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Modern left-wingers criticise liberalism's control of culture [Gopnik]
Right-wingers attack liberal faith in reason, left-wingers attack its faith in reform [Gopnik]
Cosmopolitan liberals lack national loyalty, and welcome excessive immigration [Gopnik]
Liberalism's attempt to be neutral and colour-blind erases cultural identities [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Classic Marxists see liberalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Environmental disasters result not from capitalism, but from a general drive for growth [Gopnik]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Popular imperialism gives the poor the belief that their acts have world historical meaning [Gopnik]
Patriots love their place, but nationalists have a paranoid ethnic hostility [Gopnik]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Liberal free speech is actually paid speech [Gopnik]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
A 'free' society implies a free market, which always produces predatory capitalism and inequalities [Gopnik]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan]
A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan]
The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan]
Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan]
You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan]
A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan]
Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan]
The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan]
If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan]
You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan]
Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan]
If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan]
If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan]
Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan]
Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan]