Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Crispin Wright, Crawford L. Elder and Eric R. Scerri

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri]
If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri]
If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri]
A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri]
How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri]
Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri]
Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri]
Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri]
19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri]
Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri]
Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri]
Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri]
Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri]
Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri]
Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri]
Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri]
The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri]
Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri]
To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri]