64 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
| 15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
| 15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
| 15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
| 15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
| 15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
| 12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
| 15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
| 15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
| 15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
| 15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
| 15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
| 15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
| 15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
| 15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
| 15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
| 15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
| 15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 19896 | It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R] |
| 19891 | Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R] |
| 19897 | Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R] |
| 17005 | Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R] |
| 15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |