112 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 22744 | Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 15143 | Kind essences are the categorical bases of a thing's causal powers [Bhaskar, by Chakravartty] |
| 22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22748 | Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22746 | If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22747 | A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22749 | Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22750 | Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22742 | Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22751 | If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22730 | All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22739 | God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22738 | The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22734 | God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22736 | God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22740 | God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22735 | The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22732 | The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22728 | Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22737 | An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22731 | It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |