42 ideas
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |