Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dale Jacquette, Alfred North Whitehead and Alasdair MacIntyre

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


76 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre]
In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [MacIntyre, by Kusch]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre]
Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre]
Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre]