Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dale Jacquette, Christine M. Korsgaard and Martha Nussbaum

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64 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
The Aristotelian idea that choices can be perceived needs literary texts to expound it [Nussbaum]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Philosophers after Aristotle endorsed the medical analogy for eudaimonia [Nussbaum, by Flanagan]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum]
Liberals must respect family freedom - but families are the great oppressors of women [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG]
Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum]
Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum]
Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum]
It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum]
The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum]