57 ideas
7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
9463 | Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |