Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Daniel M. Mittag, Paul Bernays and Pierre Simon de Laplace

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9 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10304 Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10303 Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10306 Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19722 We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
19723 Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
19720 Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
19721 Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
7458 The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
3441 If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]