11 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |