231 ideas
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
10237 | Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro] |
10204 | An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
13634 | Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
13643 | Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro] |
10206 | Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro] |
13651 | A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro] |
10252 | The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro] |
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
13647 | Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro] |
10208 | Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro] |
13631 | Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro] |
13640 | Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13654 | It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro] |
13666 | Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13653 | 'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro] |
10207 | Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro] |
13642 | Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro] |
13627 | There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro] |
13668 | Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro] |
13669 | Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro] |
13667 | Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro] |
13624 | The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro] |
13660 | Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro] |
13662 | First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro] |
13673 | The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro] |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
13650 | Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro] |
15944 | Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine] |
13645 | In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro] |
13649 | Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
13629 | Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro] |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
13637 | If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro] |
13626 | Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro] |
10257 | Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro] |
10253 | Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro] |
10251 | The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
13632 | Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro] |
10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
10209 | A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro] |
13674 | We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro] |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
10235 | A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro] |
13633 | 'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro] |
10239 | The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro] |
13644 | Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro] |
10240 | Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro] |
13636 | An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro] |
13670 | Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro] |
10238 | The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro] |
10214 | Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro] |
13648 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro] |
13658 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro] |
13659 | Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro] |
13675 | Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro] |
10234 | Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro] |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
13635 | 'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro] |
13628 | We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro] |
13630 | Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro] |
13646 | Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro] |
13661 | A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro] |
10201 | Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro] |
13641 | Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
13676 | Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro] |
13677 | Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro] |
10213 | Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro] |
18243 | Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
18245 | Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro] |
13652 | The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro] |
10236 | There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
10256 | For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro] |
13657 | First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro] |
10202 | Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro] |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
10205 | Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
13656 | Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro] |
10222 | Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro] |
10218 | Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro] |
10224 | The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro] |
10228 | Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro] |
10230 | The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro] |
10249 | The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro] |
10273 | Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro] |
10276 | Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
10270 | The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro] |
10221 | Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro] |
10248 | Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro] |
10220 | Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro] |
10223 | There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro] |
8703 | Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend] |
10274 | Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro] |
10200 | We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro] |
10210 | If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro] |
10215 | Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro] |
10233 | Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro] |
10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
10280 | A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
13625 | Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
10254 | Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro] |
10255 | Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
13663 | Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
13638 | Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro] |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
10272 | The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro] |
10275 | A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
10203 | We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
10229 | Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro] |
9626 | A structure is an abstraction, focussing on relationships, and ignoring other features [Shapiro] |
10217 | We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro] |
9554 | We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro] |
10231 | Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |