Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Danielle Macbeth, Thomas Grundmann and Karl Popper

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19086 Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
19093 Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12177 Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
5451 Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
19091 Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
19088 For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12179 Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]