Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Franois Recanati and Alasdair MacIntyre

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


86 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre]
In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [MacIntyre, by Kusch]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati]
Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati]
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre]
Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre]
Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre]