Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, H.L.A. Hart and Tyler Burge

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29 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]