17 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
15710 | Bohr explained the periodic table and chemical properties of elements, using the quantum atom [Kumar] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |