Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Michael Smith and Hugh LaFollette

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
20877 Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette]
20878 We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
20881 The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
20886 Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
20879 Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette]
20880 Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8326 Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
10379 Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]