Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Michael Smith and Rowland Stout

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]