17 ideas
| 16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
| 16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
| 10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |
| 16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
| 16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |