55 ideas
| 22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
| 22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
| 22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
| 22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
| 22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
| 22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
| 22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
| 22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
| 22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
| 22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
| 22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
| 22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
| 22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
| 22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
| 22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
| 8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
| 10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
| 22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
| 22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
| 22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
| 22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
| 22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
| 22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
| 22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
| 22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
| 22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
| 22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
| 22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
| 22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
| 22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
| 22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
| 22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
| 22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |