111 ideas
6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
17992 | The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE] |
7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
9463 | Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
21342 | A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
16473 | Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker] |
19258 | Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya] |
2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
6672 | Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe] |
20147 | Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE] |
6349 | I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE] |
14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
14739 | 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
21233 | The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE] |
8039 | Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
22151 | The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE] |
11056 | The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE] |
8033 | Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
8032 | Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
11050 | Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE] |
23726 | Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M] |
18676 | We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE] |
11057 | It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE] |
5925 | The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
5902 | For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
5903 | 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE] |
5907 | Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE] |
16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |