241 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis] |
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis] |
5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis] |
13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis] |
5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis] |
13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis] |
13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis] |
5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis] |
5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis] |
5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis] |
5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis] |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
9381 | If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis] |
5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis] |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis] |
5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis] |
13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis] |
5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis] |
5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis] |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis] |
5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis] |
5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis] |
5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis] |
13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis] |
5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |