18 ideas
| 15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
| 15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
| 15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
| 20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
| 20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
| 20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
| 20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |